# Machine Learning Theory 2023 Lecture 7

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- Online Learning Intro
- Basic Protocol
- ▶ Basic Algorithms
- Basic Performance Guarantees



# **Online Learning Intro**

When/why might IID be an unreasonable assumption?

- ▶ When humans (other learning systems) are in the loop
- ▶ When predictions are turned into actions
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Why not?

Our mass production changed consumer preferences.



# Online learning focus

#### Main idea

No assumptions about the data  $\Leftrightarrow$  An evil opponent controls the data.

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Change of setup/perspective/emphasis

- ► Tight feedback loop (recurring prediction task)
- Continuous learning (no training/learning separation)
- Adversarial analysis (Prequential principle, individual sequence.
   There is only the data. Also establishes robustness of statistical estimators.)
- Emphasis on both computational and statistical performance
- ► Regret: relative notion of performance

# **Application domains**


#### Truly sequential problems:

- electricity demand prediction (EDF, also Amazon)
- mobile device power management
- hybrid cars engine switching
- caching
- medical trials (bandits)
- online advertisement (bandits)
- weather forecasting
- data compression (CTW)
- statistical testing
- investment (Universal portfolios)
- input assistants (e.g. Dasher)
- prediction with expert advice (meld human and machine prediction)
- online convex optimisation

# Wider application

- ▶ Big data sets (transport state of online algorithm instead of data, online to batch conversion)
- Convex optimisation
- ► Game theory (online learning methods for approximate equilibrium)
- General understanding
  - Uncertainty and ways to manipulate it
  - Makeup of and patterns in data
  - Complexity of classes of strategies

## **Overview of Second Half of Course**



Material: course notes on MLT website.

# The menu for today



Two fundamental and prototypical online learning problems

- ► The mix loss game
  - Aggregating Algorithm
  - ► Performance analysis
- ► The dot loss game
  - Hedge Algorithm
  - Performance analysis

## The Mix loss Game

# Mix loss game

## Protocol

- For t = 1, 2, ...
  - ▶ Learner chooses a distribution  $w_t \in \triangle_K$  on K "experts".
  - Adversary reveals loss vector  $\ell_t \in (-\infty, \infty]^K$ .
  - ► Learner's loss is the **mix loss**  $-\ln\left(\sum_{k=1}^K w_t^k e^{-\ell_t^k}\right)$

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#### Instances:

- Investment (loss is negative log-growth)
- Data compression (loss is code length)
- Probability forecasting (loss is logarithmic loss)
  - Cross-entropy loss (GANs)
  - Logistic loss

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#### Connection to statistical learning:

For any finite hypothesis class  $\mathcal{H} = \{h_1, \dots, h_K\}$  of binary classifiers, we may consider  $\ell_t^k = \mathbf{1}[h_k(x_t) \neq y_t]$ .

# Two useful properties of the mix loss

#### Fact

Mix loss passes on additive constant  $c \in \mathbb{R}$ :

$$-\ln\left(\sum_{k=1}^K w_t^k \mathrm{e}^{-(\ell_t^k+c)}\right) = c - \ln\left(\sum_{k=1}^K w_t^k \mathrm{e}^{-\ell_t^k}\right)$$

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### Fact

Mix loss of deterministic prediction  $w_t = e_j \in \triangle_{\mathsf{K}}$  equals  $\ell_t^j$ :

$$-\ln\left(\sum_{k=1}^K w_t^k e^{-\ell_t^k}\right) = -\ln\left(e^{-\ell_t^j}\right) = \ell_t^j$$

# Mix loss objective

Obviously we cannot guarantee small loss.

Idea: relative evaluation, i.e. seek performance close to best expert.

## Definition (Regret)

After T rounds of the mix loss game, the regret is given by

$$R_T = \underbrace{\sum_{t=1}^{T} -\ln\left(\sum_{k=1}^{K} w_t^k e^{-\ell_t^k}\right)}_{\text{Learner's mix loss}} - \underbrace{\min_{k} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \ell_t^k}_{\text{loss of best expert}}$$

Goal: design a strategy for Learner that guarantees low regret.

# Worst-case regret and Minimax regret

A strategy for the learner assigns to each history  $(w_1, \ell_1), \ldots, (w_{t-1}, \ell_{t-1})$  a next action  $w_t$ .

## Definition (Worst-case regret)

The worst-case regret of a strategy S for the learner is

$$\max_{\ell_1} \cdots \max_{\ell_T} R_T$$

where the  $w_t$  are chosen according to S.

## Definition (Minimax regret)

The minimax regret of the mix loss game is

$$\min_{\text{learner strategy}} \text{worst-case regret} = \min_{\boldsymbol{w}_1} \max_{\boldsymbol{\ell}_1} \cdots \min_{\boldsymbol{w}_T} \max_{\boldsymbol{\ell}_T} R_T$$

# Mix loss regret: lower bound (adversary construction)

#### Theorem

Any strategy for Learner has worst-case regret  $\geq \ln K$ , already in T=1 round.

## Proof.

Look at  $k_{\text{low}} \in \arg\min_k w_1^k$  so that  $w_1^{k_{\text{low}}} \leq \frac{1}{K}$ . Administer loss killing everyone but  $k_{\text{low}}$ 

$$\ell_1^k = \begin{cases} \infty & k \neq k_{\text{low}} \\ 0 & k = k_{\text{low}} \end{cases}$$

Now Learner's mix loss equals

$$-\ln\left(\sum_{k=1}^{K} w_{1}^{k} e^{-\ell_{1}^{k}}\right) = -\ln\left(w_{1}^{k_{low}} e^{-\ell_{1}^{k_{low}}}\right) \geq \ln K + 0$$



# The Aggregating Algorithm for mix loss

## Definition (Aggregating Algorithm)

The Aggregating Algorithm plays weights in round t:

$$w_t^k = \frac{e^{-\sum_{s=1}^{t-1} \ell_s^k}}{\sum_{j=1}^K e^{-\sum_{s=1}^{t-1} \ell_s^j}}$$
(AA)

or, equivalently,  $w_1^k = \frac{1}{K}$  and

$$w_{t+1}^k = \frac{w_t^k e^{-\ell_t^k}}{\sum_{j=1}^K w_t^j e^{-\ell_t^j}}$$
 (AA, incremental)

#### Many names

- ► (Generalisation of) Bayes' rule
- Exponentially weighted average

# Mix loss regret: upper bound (algorithm)

#### Theorem

The regret of the Aggregating Algorithm is at most  $R_T \leq \ln K$  for all T > 0.

## Proof.

Crucial observation is that mix loss telescopes

$$\begin{split} \sum_{t=1}^{T} -\ln\left(\sum_{k=1}^{K} w_{t}^{k} e^{-\ell_{t}^{k}}\right) &= \sum_{t=1}^{T} -\ln\left(\sum_{k=1}^{K} \frac{e^{-\sum_{s=1}^{t-1} \ell_{s}^{k}}}{\sum_{j=1}^{K} e^{-\sum_{s=1}^{t-1} \ell_{s}^{j}}} e^{-\ell_{t}^{k}}\right) \\ &= \sum_{t=1}^{T} -\ln\left(\frac{\sum_{k=1}^{K} e^{-\sum_{s=1}^{t} \ell_{s}^{k}}}{\sum_{j=1}^{K} e^{-\sum_{s=1}^{t-1} \ell_{s}^{j}}}\right) \\ &= -\ln\left(\sum_{k=1}^{K} e^{-\sum_{t=1}^{T} \ell_{t}^{k}}\right) + \ln K. \end{split}$$

Bounding the sum from below by a max results in

$$\leq \min_{k} \sum_{t=1}^{I} \ell_t^k + \ln K \tag{1}$$

## The Dot loss Game

# **Dot loss game**

#### Protocol

- ▶ For t = 1, 2, ...
  - ▶ Learner chooses a distribution  $w_t \in \triangle_K$  on K "experts".
  - Adversary reveals loss vector  $\ell_t \in [0,1]^K$ .
  - Learner's loss is the **dot loss**  $w_t^\intercal \ell_t = \sum_{k=1}^K w_t^k \ell_t^k$

#### Many names:

- Decision Theoretic Online Learning
- Prediction with Expert Advice
- ► The Hedge setting
- ▶ The Experts setting

# Dot loss objective

## Definition (Regret)

Regret after T rounds:

$$R_T = \sum_{t=1}^T w_t^{\mathsf{T}} \ell_t - \min_k \sum_{t=1}^T \ell_t^k$$

Goal: design an algorithm for Learner that guarantees low regret.

# Mix loss vs Dot loss (Jensen)

By Jensen's Inequality for the convex function  $x \mapsto -\ln(x)$ 

$$\underbrace{-\ln\left(\sum_{k=1}^{K}w_{t}^{k}e^{-\ell_{t}^{k}}\right)}_{\text{mix loss}} \leq \underbrace{\sum_{k=1}^{K}w_{t}^{k}\ell_{t}^{k}}_{\text{dot loss}}$$
(2)

So the dot loss game is harsher for the Learner ...
...but maybe we can find a converse inequality (with small overhead)

# Mix loss vs Dot loss (Hoeffding)

## Lemma (Hoeffding)

Fix zero-mean r.v.  $X \in [a, b]$ , and let  $\eta \in \mathbb{R}$ . Then

$$\mathbb{E}[e^{\eta X}] \leq e^{\eta^2(b-a)^2/8}$$

(Note: Lemma is main ingredient of but not equal to Hoeffding's Bound)

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(Note: Lemma is main ingredient of but not equal to Hoeffding's Bound) Application: Fix  $w_t \in \triangle_K$  and  $\ell_t \in [0,1]^K$ . Define r.v. X to take value  $w_t^\mathsf{T} \ell_t - \ell_t^k$  with probability  $w_t^k$  for all  $k = 1, \ldots, K$ . Then X has mean zero, and takes values in an interval of length 1. So

$$\sum_{k} w_t^k e^{\eta(w_t^\intercal \ell_t - \ell_t^k)} \leq e^{\eta^2/8}$$

and hence we obtain a converse to (2):

$$\underbrace{w_t^\mathsf{T} \ell_t}_{\text{dot loss}} \leq \underbrace{-\frac{1}{\eta} \ln \left( \sum_k w_t^k e^{-\eta \ell_t^k} \right)}_{\eta\text{-scaled mix loss}} + \frac{\eta}{8}$$

# Hedge algorithm

Idea: re-use AA for mix loss, now with *learning rate*  $\eta > 0$ .

## Definition (Hedge Algorithm)

The Hedge algorithm with learning rate  $\eta$  plays weights in round t:

$$w_t^k = \frac{e^{-\eta \sum_{s=1}^{t-1} \ell_s^k}}{\sum_{j=1}^K e^{-\eta \sum_{s=1}^{t-1} \ell_s^j}}.$$
 (Hedge)

or, equivalently,  $w_1^k = \frac{1}{K}$  and

$$w_{t+1}^k = \frac{w_t^k e^{-\eta \ell_t^k}}{\sum_{j=1}^K w_t^j e^{-\eta \ell_t^j}}$$
 (Hedge, incremental)

# Hedge analysis

#### Lemma

The regret of Hedge is bounded by

$$R_T \leq \frac{\ln K}{\eta} + T \frac{\eta}{8}$$

## Proof.

Applying Hoeffding's Lemma to the loss of each round gives

$$\sum_{t=1}^{T} w_t^{\mathsf{T}} \ell_t \leq \sum_{t=1}^{T} \left( \underbrace{\frac{-1}{\eta} \ln \left( \sum_{k=1}^{K} w_t^k e^{-\eta \ell_t^k} \right)}_{\mathsf{mix} \ \mathsf{loss}} + \underbrace{\eta/8}_{\mathsf{overhead}} \right)$$

The mix loss telescopes, and is bounded by (1) by

$$\sum_{t=1}^{T} \frac{-1}{\eta} \ln \left( \sum_{k=1}^{K} w_t^k e^{-\eta \ell_t^k} \right) \leq \min_{k} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \ell_t^k + \frac{\ln K}{\eta}. \tag{3}$$

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# **Hedge tuning**

#### Theorem

The Hedge regret bound is minimised at  $\eta = \sqrt{\frac{8 \ln K}{T}}$  where it states

$$R_T \leq \sqrt{T/2 \ln K}$$
.

#### Proof.

Pick  $\eta$  to cancel the derivative.

Note: tuning requires knowledge of the time horizon T. This can be solved by the "Doubling Trick". You will see it in the exercises.

# Regret lower bound for the Dot loss game

Is the Hedge algorithm actually good?

#### Theorem

The minimax regret for the dot loss game is  $\Omega\left(\sqrt{T \ln K}\right)$ .

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
## Proof. (Bonus Material).

We will see in the homework that there is an adversary for the 2-expert game with lower bound  $c\sqrt{T}$ . Here we boost it to K experts. The construction works by splitting the horizon T into  $T/\log K$  epochs. Within each epoch, we will cluster the experts into 2 groups, and apply the 2-expert adversary to each group. This inflicts regret  $c\sqrt{T/\log K}$  w.r.t. each expert in the winning group. With K experts, we can split them  $\log K$  many times completely independently (see the figure below). The overall regret w.r.t. the expert that is in the wining group in every epoch is

$$R_T \ge \log(K)c\sqrt{T/\log K} = c\sqrt{T\log K}$$



# Regret lower bound for the Dot loss game



## **Conclusion**

#### Two simple settings.

- Adversary controls data
- ► Efficient learning algorithms
- ► With performance guarantees
- ► Matching lower bounds