Path Monotonicity and Truthful Implementation

Rudolf Müller Maastricht University

joint work with André Berger Seyed Hossein Naeemi

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Introduction

Some questions in multi-dimensional MD

- When is monotonicity of the allocation rule sufficient for truthful implementation?
- If not sufficient, what do we have to add?
- How much freedom do we have to set incentive compatible transfers?

This paper

- Link between network approach and analytical approaches.
- Finite sets of alternatives: (path-)monotonicity is equivalent with implementability.

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Setting

Single Agent (w.l.o.g)

- A set of outcomes
- $\mathcal{T} \subset \mathbb{R}^k$ set of types, private information
- $v: T \times A \to \mathbb{R}$
- $f: T \rightarrow A$ allocation rule

truthful implementation

f is called truthfully implementable if there exist transfer $\pi:T\to\mathbb{R}$ such that for all $s,t\in T$

 $v(f(s),s) + \pi(s) \ge v(f(t),s) + \pi(t)$

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Network approach

Type-graph

- Define a complete, directed graph T_f with node set T.
- Define either of the two arc lengths (see Archer and Kleinberg (2008))

$$\begin{split} l_p(s,t) &:= v(f(s),s) - v(f(t),s), \\ l_u(s,t) &:= v(f(t),t) - v(f(t),s). \end{split}$$

• Truthful transfers are node potentials with respect to p-length:

$$\pi(t) \leq \pi(s) + \nu(f(s),s) - \nu(f(t),s) = \pi(s) + l_p(s,t)$$

• Equilibrium utility is node potential with respect to $I_u(s, t)$

$$v(f(t),t) + \pi(t) \leq \pi(s) + v(f(s),s) + I_u(s,t)$$

Rochet's characterization

Theorem (Rochet (1987),...,Archer and Kleinberg (2008))

The following are equivalent:

- *f* is truthfully implementable
- 2 T_f does not have a negative cycle with respect to *p*-length
- 3 T_f does not have a negative cycle with respect to *u*-length

Proof: $(2) \Leftrightarrow (3)$

 $I_u(s,t) = I_p(s,t) + v(f(t),t) - v(f(s),s).$

$(2) \Rightarrow (1)$

Fix some node x. Define $\pi(t) = \inf(l_p(P) \mid P \text{ is path from } t \text{ to } x)$. Observe

 $\pi(t) \leq +l_p(t,s) + \pi(s).$

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Monotonicity

Definition

An allocation rule is called *monotone* if for all $s, t \in T$: $v(f(t), t) - v(f(s), t) \ge v(f(t), s) - v(f(s), s)$

Observations

- Monotonicity is equivalent to no-negative 2-cycle: *l_p(s, t)* + *l_p(t, s)* ≥ 0.
- Monotonicity is necessary for *f* being implementable.
- Suppose $v(a, t) = a \cdot t$, that is for every a v(a, .) is *linear* in t, then v(f(t), t) v(f(s), t) + v(f(s), s) v(f(t), s) = (f(t) f(s))(t s).
- Monotonicity is a natural generalization of 1-dim monotonicity.

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Jehiel, Moldovanu, Stacchetti (1999), M., Peréa, Wolf (2007)

T convex, v(a, t) linear in t, then an allocation rule $f : T \to A$ is implementable if and only if it is monotone and path-integrals of the vector field "induced by v and f" are equal to 0.

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Path-monotonicity

Revenue Equivalence literature

Krishna and Maenner (2001) and Milgrom and Segal (2002): with sufficient analytical assumptions we have for every implementable $f, s, t \in T$:

$$\mathsf{v}(f(t),t) + \pi(t) = \mathsf{v}(f(s),s) + \pi(s) + \int_{\sigma} \Psi \cdot \sigma \,\, d\sigma$$

for any "smooth" path σ from s to t, "appropriate" vector field Ψ .

Path-integral

Assume $\sigma:[0,1]
ightarrow {\mathcal T}$, then

$$\int_{\sigma} \Psi \cdot \sigma \ d\sigma \ := \int_{0}^{1} \Psi(\sigma(x)) \cdot \sigma'(x) \ dx.$$

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Path-monotonicity

Appropriate Ψ

If v(a, .) is convex for all $a \in A$:

 Ψ = sub-differential of v(f(t), s) at s = t.

If v(a, .) is differentiable for all $a \in A$:

 Ψ = differential of v(f(t), s) at s = t.

Path-monotonicity

Path-integrals of Ψ exist and

$$\int_{\sigma} \Psi \cdot \sigma d\sigma \leq v(f(t),t) - v(f(t),s) = l_u(s,t).$$

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Path-monotonicity

Observation

For "RE settings" path monotonicity necessary for implementation.

What to add?

Suppose path-integrals of Ψ on closed paths are equal to 0. Fix type x, and define transfer $\pi(t) = \int_{\sigma} \Psi \cdot \sigma \, d\sigma - v(f(t), t)$.

$$\begin{aligned} \pi(t) - \pi(s) &= \int_{x}^{t} \Psi \cdot \sigma d\sigma - v(f(t), t) - \int_{x}^{s} \Psi \cdot \sigma d\sigma + v(f(s), s) \\ &= \int_{s}^{t} \Psi \cdot \sigma d\sigma - v(f(t), t) + v(f(s), s) \\ &\leq l_{u}(s, t) - v(f(t), t) + v(f(s), s) \\ &= v(f(s), s) - v(f(t), s). \end{aligned}$$

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$$= v(f(s), s) - v(f(t), s).$$

Characterization differentiable valuations

Theorem

Let $T \subset \mathbb{R}^k$ be path-connected, for all *a* let v(a, .) be *differentiable* in *T*, and let the norms of the gradients of the functions v(f(t), .) be bounded, then an allocation rule $f : T \to A$ is implementable if and only if

- path-monotonicity holds,
- path-integrals on closed paths are equal to 0.

Here, $\Psi(t)$ is the gradient of v(f(t), .) at t.

One direction resembles Milgrom and Segal (2002).

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Characterization convex valuations

Theorem

Let $T \subset \mathbb{R}^k$ be convex, v(a, .) convex in t, with non-empty subdifferential at all $t \in T$, then an allocation rule $f : T \to A$ is implementable if and only if

- path-monotonicity holds on line-segments,
- path-integrals on triangles are equal to 0.

Here, $\Psi(t)$ is any vector chosen from the sub-differential of v(f(t), .) at t.

Elementary, direct proof is given in the paper.

Local implementability

Local implementation

f is called *locally implementable*, if for every $t \in T$ there exists some neighborhood U of t such that f is implementable on $T \cap U$.

Characterization

Let T be path-connected, v(a, .) convex for all a, and let f be path-monotone. Then f is implementable if and only if it is locally implementable. (Similar for convex T and convex valuations).

Proof

By Lebesgue Number Lemma (as in Archer and Kleinberg (2008)).

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Finite A

Lemma

Let $T \subseteq \mathbb{R}^d$. Assume that for every $a \in A$ the function $v(a,.): T \to \mathbb{R}$ is continuous and f is onto. For all $a \in A$ let

$$D_{\mathsf{a}} := \overline{f^{-1}(\mathsf{a})}$$

If $f : T \to A$ is monotone and $T \cap \bigcap_{a \in A} D_a \neq \emptyset$ then f is implementable.



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Characterization for finite A

Differentiable Case

Let $T \subseteq \mathbb{R}^d$ be simply path connected, v(a, .) differentiable for all $a \in A$ and A be finite. $f : T \to A$ is implementable if and only if f is path monotone.

Convex case

Let $T \subseteq \mathbb{R}^d$ convex, v(a, .) convex for all $a \in A$ and A be finite. $f : T \to A$ is implementable if and only if it is path-monotone on line segments.

Proof

Using previous Lemma we show that *f* is locally implementable. Then apply characterization based on local implementability.

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Using previous Lemma we show that f is locally implementable. Then apply characterization based on local implementability.

Assume path-integrals with respect to Ψ exist

- Path-monotonicity implies monotonicity.
- v satisfies monotone differences if for all a, b ∈ A,
 v(a,.) v(b,.) is monotone (in the classical sense) when restricted to line segments.
- Note: monotone differences holds if v(a,.) is linear.
- monotonicity + monotone differences implies implementability (no analytical assumptions needed).
- For convex valuations v(a,.), we provide T ⊂ ℝ and f that is monotone but not implementable.

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Conclusions

- By replacing monotonicity by path-monotonicity we get characterizations for convex and differentiable valuation functions similar to those known for linear valuation functions.
- For finite *A*, path-monotonicity is equivalent to implementability in those settings.
- Monotonicity implies path-monotonicity, if we assume monotone differences.

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